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Although the niche figures prominently in contemporary
theories of organization, analysts often fail to tie micro
processes within the niche to long-term changes in the
broader environment. In this paper, we advance argu-
ments about the relationship between an organization's
niche and evolution in the structure of its organizational
population over time. We focus on the technological
niche and processes of positioning and crowding among
firms in the niche space, relating them to the level of con-
centration among all firms in the market. Building on pre-
vious empirical studies in organizational ecology, we
study the evolution of concentration in the American
automobile industry from 1885 to 1981 and estimate
models of the hazard of exit of individual producers from
the market. The findings show that niche and concentra-
tion interact in complex ways, yielding a more unified
depiction of organizational evolution than typically
described or reported.•
Many analysts' accounts of the U.S. automobile industry's
development, including conjectured reasons for particular
firms succeeding and failing, can be readily interpreted from
the perspective of the organizational niche. For instance,
General Motors' historical success against Ford is hailed by
many as the consequence of its early wide-ranging multiprod-
uct market position-a broad niche, in ecological terms. In
more recent years, the Japanese manufacturers showed that
they could build a sizeable presence after entering the mar-
ket with small low-cost cars, a part of the market in which
major American producers were not very competitive.
According to a niche interpretation. one would say that the
Japanese firms benefited from initial niche positions with lit-
tle overlap from existing firms, allowing them to gain
strength before attempting more direct competition.
In the background of such niche-based processes. the com-
petitive dynamics of the automobile industry have been dri-
ven by both cost and innovation, each of which is tied to
scale. The scale of automobile production has increased
steadily over the last century, and the race to remain compet-
itively large often constitutes a main reason why automobile
firms behave as they do. For instance, insider accounts of
the recent round of mergers among large automakers, such
as Chrysler and Daimler, point to the increasing scale of the
global industry as the critical motivation IVlasic and Stertz,
2000). As a result of this scale orientation, the automobile
industry is characterized generally by a long-term evolutionary
pattern of increasing concentration.
Industry consolidation and a trend toward market oligopoly
have also marked the evolutionary paths of numerous other
industries. Examples from various sectors of the U.S. econo-
my include the wine and beer industries. the airline industry,
the petroleum production industry, the motion-picture distrib-
ution industry, the microcomputer industry, and the steel
industry, to name a few. Concentration propels the formation
of a strong and visible market structure whose effects
inevitably reverberate through all levels of the social system.
influencing the behavior of both economic and non-economic
actors. For instance, industrial organization economists have
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shown that a broad spectrum of a firm's activities and
processes are directly affected by the rising industrial con-
centration: incentives to Innovate, mechanisms for price set-
ting, the expectation for investment returns and stability, bud-
geting for advertising expenses, and the distribution of
wages all seem to hinge on the rising market power of a few
dominant producers and the relationships evolving among
them. Yet few economists have focused on analyzing the
social dimension of market structure. By Scherer's (1970:
210) account, "the economist IS forced, without denying their
importance, to view vanatlons In Industry conduct and perfor-
mance due to differences in social structure as an unex-
plained residual or 'noise' " At one level, our goal here is to
demonstrate that this "unexplained" component of the con-
textual constraints and opportunities faced by organizations
operating in concentrating industries contains important and
systematic processes of organizational evolution that analysts
can ill afford to Ignore.
In many Industnes ,n which scale prOVides an advantage, the
gradual rise to dominance of a few large competitors is
accompanied by a horizontal expansion of their market posi-
tions or niches. This IS the case with the Daimler-Chrysler
merger In the auto Industry, the WarnerBros.-Lorimar merger
In the motion-picture distribution industry, the LTV-Republic
merger In the steel Industry, and the American-TWA merger
In the airline industry. Accordingly, it seems important that
analyses of organizational evolution In concentrating Indus-
tries deal with questions of niche and scale simultaneously
and how they interrelate. The answer is far from obvious and
might be complex. Theories of aging (Hannan et aI., 1998a),
density (Hannan et aI., 1998b), niche width IDobrev, Kim, and
Hannan, 2001), scale competition (Dobrev and Carroll, 2000),
and resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985; Boone, Broecheler,
and Carroll, 2000) all seem to be involved. Consequently, our
efforts here represent an attempt to integrate insights from
the relevant theories Into a unified empirical model of organi-
zational evolution. To do so, we set forth a variety of
hypotheses about how niche and scale Interrelate to produce
variations In organizational mortality, focusing on how niche
processes change as the industry consolidates.
In contemporary organizational theory, the ecological per-
spective contains the most developed notions about the
niche Hannan and Freeman (1977) gave the concept fresh
legs when they linked it to models of organizational change
and environmental selection. Their vision of the niche was
broad, defined to include "all those combinations of lenviron-
mental! resource levels at which the population can survive
and reproduce Itself" IHannan and Freeman, 1977: 947). Han-
nan and Freeman (1989) made clear that the niche was an
n-dimensional resource space, Including social, economiC,
and political dimensions. They also distinguished between
fundamental and realized niches, the latter representing the
constrained n-dimensional resource space found when com-
petitors are present.
The reVitalized niche concept seeded numerous and varied
analyses of how organizational environments affect the viabil-
Ity of particular types of organizations le.g., Carroll, 1988;
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Singh, 1990; Baum and Singh, 1994; Dobrev, 1999, 20011. It
also germinated several niche models about specific environ-
mental factors, such as the age and size of the potential
membership base (McPherson, 1983; McPherson, Popielarz,
and Drobnic, 1992) and the variability of consumer demand
IFreeman and Hannan, 19831. An especially productive cur-
rent line of work uses the locations of organizations relative
to each other along one or a few dimensions of resource
space to assess competitive intensity le.g., Barnett and Car-
roll, 1987; Baum and Mezias, 1993; Podolny, Stuart, and Han-
nan, 1996; Baum and Haveman, 19971. As Stinchcombe
11990: 1361 noted, "socially organized market segments carry
different information," and organizational structures reflect
these differences.
Yet despite this progress, niche theory could still be pushed
further. As Carroll and Hannan 12000) noted, contrary to much
early thinking, organizational ecology's most developed theo-
ries and models tend to be about organizational population
dynamics rather than broader environmental conditions. This
is true for niche theory as well, where concerns of niche
width, position, and crowding often take precedence over
broader factors, including population structure. Although this
"micro" orientation is justified by the strong empirical find-
ings to date, it seems to rely on an incomplete conception of
the niche, one grounded in the realized niche. Other broader
environmental factors are not ignored entirely, but they are
not given much theoretical attention, usually getting relegat-
ed to the status of control variables.
By contrast, our efforts here reflect an attempt to tie long-
term changes in the broader environment in a meaningful
theoretical way to the micro processes within the niche. Akin
to recent investigations by Barron (1999) and Hannan 119971,
we consider the overall structure of the population as an
aspect of environment. We develop arguments about the
relationship between an organization's technological niche
and changes in the structure of its organizational population
over time. We analyze processes of positioning and crowding
among firms in the niche space and, at the environmental
level, relate these processes to the level of concentration in
the population, following in a tradition that includes Pfeffer
and Salancik 11978).
We chose to study U.S. automobile producers because this
population's historical development, like that of a number of
other industries, is characterized by a long-term trend of con-
solidation. Our choice of industry context is motivated in
large part by an additional consideration, namely, cumulativity
in social science. Previous studies of the U.S. automobile
manufacturing population have examined basic ecological
problems such as age, size, and density dependence (Han-
nan et aI., 1998a, 1998b; Hannan, 1998; Carroll and Hannan,
2000). We extend this analysis here by developing a unified
model of organizational mortality. The unified model incorpo-
rates more fully processes related to niche and scale-niche
width, niche position, niche overlap, and scale competition.
Our specifications integrate findings from the earlier studies
of this population (examining age dependence, density
dependence, population aging, and scale competition) with
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It IS commonplace In organizatIOnal theory
to claim 10 be integrative 01 vanous theo-
retical perspectives. In one sense, our
efforts are no different than most-we
stnve to show how vanous processes
mix together empirically when operallng
Simultaneously. In another sense, we
think that our effort IS distinctive The
IntegratIon that we seek occurs within a
single coherent theoretical perspective
and attempts to reconcile conflicting ele-
ments We also find that many IntegrallOn
efforts do not bUild cumulatively on pner
model specIficatIonS as exactly as we do
here (usmg, In particular. models In Han-
nan at al 1998b. and Dobrav and Carrol
20001
2
Though organizational ecologists have
used Industry age to capture processes
related to evolving market and social
structure over tIme (Hannan, 1997
Dobrav Kim, and Hannan. 200 11. IndUstry
concentration seems to be a more appro-
pnate covariate because we develop
pl'op:lSltlonS that link organlzahonal prop-
erties and evolVIng IndUstry Structure
While evolutIOn IS not a statIC process
and, by definItion. must unfOld over tIme.
the opposite IS not true tIme can pass
but the IndUStry may not consolidate The
processes we examine and theorIze
about occur because the market concen-
trates and partitionS, not simply because
lime passes If one were to test our theo-
ry In an mdustry that dId not consolidate,
or In which concentrahon declined as a
result of deregulahon, and do so by mea-
sUring Industry age rather than concentra-
tIOn, the findings would surely be at odds
with our predictIons
ideas developed here on how technological niche width,
niche position, and niche overlap Interact In organizational
evolution as concentration increases. We seek to transfer the
Isolated progress achieved within the various fragments to a
unified specification and to obtain better-fitting models-and
thus more satisfYing explanations-by integrating
processes.'
THE ORGANIZATIONAL NICHE IN AN EVOLUTIONARY
CONTEXT
In conSidering the niche of an organization, we attend to the
width, pOSition, and overlap With others with respect to tech-
nology. The niche width of an organization refers to ItS vari-
ance In resource utilization (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). So,
organizations pursuing strategies based on operations across
a wide range of environmental resources possess a Wide or
broad niche and would be claSSified as generalists. Specialist
organizations pursue strategies based on operations across a
tight band of resources, so their niches are narrow. A firm's
position or location in the niche can be described by the mid-
point of this range Its niche overlap is the degree to which
other firms also occupy the firm's niche range. Niche-overlap
density is the number of other firms whose niches fall within
at least some part of the range. We analyze an organization's
niche In a technological space IPodolny, Stuart, and Hannan,
1996; Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan, 20011.
In examining evolution, we track changes in market concen-
tration to consider corresponding changes in social and orga-
nizational structure and their effects. We regard the consoli-
dation level of a population as part of the broader
environment because, unlike niche-based variables, it is rela-
tively immutable With respect to short-term firm movements
and strategic actions This general theoretical strategy fol-
lows a tradition in organization theory dating back at least to
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who related concentration levels
to market uncertainty. It IS analytically convenient here
because the dominant long-term trend characteriZing the
American automobile market is increasing concentration 2
Only fifteen years after its inception, the industry witnessed
the operation of more than 300 automakers; already, concen-
tration had dropped by two-thirds from ItS initial maXimum, a
corollary of the very small number of entrants in the first
decade of the industry's history. The competitive process that
ensued in the follOWing decades led to significant consolida-
tion, and by the eve of World War II, more than nine out of
ten producers operating at the beginning of the century had
either failed or eXited the Industry. The dominance of the Big
Three was solidified In the postwar years, and despite the
entry of some highly specialized firms In the late 1970s that
accounted for a modest upturn in denSity, concentration In
the Industry remains high. ThiS strong consolidation occurred
because during the formative years of the population, broad
niche width (generalism) and position in the resource-rich
market center conferred competitive advantages to firms
(Chandler, 1962; Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan, 2001). Such firms
succeeded in dominating the market center, eliminated small-
er generalists that fell Victim to scale-based selection, and
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The assumptions here differ considerably
from those of the original theory of niche
width, in which Hannan and Freeman
(1977, 1989) assumed that organizations
face only one enVIronmental state at a
POint in time and thaI the alternation of
states over time Imposes contradictory
demands on the organization, Here the
various states of the enVIronment may
Impose complementary demands
Evolution of Niches
drove concentration high. This drive to dominance by large
generalists left bleak chances for success for other generalist
firms seeking to position themselves in the center (Dobrev
and Carroll, 2000).
We build theoretical arguments against this backdrop. While
we recognize and model the forces underlying consolidation,
we do not (for reasons of space and parsimony) specify them
here as formal hypotheses. Instead, we focus on developing
evolutionary arguments, those related to niche processes
that are transformed with population evolution. Our point of
departure is resource-partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985),
which we use to predict how concentration might alter the
mortality consequences of a firm's niche width. Then, based
on an understanding of what goes on in a partitioning popula-
tion, we develop novel theoretical arguments about how
niche position and niche overlap change as well with consoli-
dation. We also consider the vexing issue of niche dimen-
sionality.
Niche Width and the Evolution of Concentration
When environments change in uncertain ways, generalist
organizations typically display lower mortality rates than spe-
cialists (Freeman and Hannan, 19831. Dobrev, Kim, and Han-
nan (2001) found that this is the case for automobile manu-
facturers in Europe, and we expect a similar main effect of
niche width in the U.S. But resource-partitioning theory sug-
gests a firm's niche width does not imply the same life
chances when the market evolves and concentrates. The
original insight of the theory comes from comparing the envi-
ronmental resource space available for specialists as overall
market concentration rises. Almost all important variation in
market concentration derives from generalist crowding and
consolidation. So, the comparison can be made by measuring
the total area outside combined generalist targets under dif-
ferent stages of generalist competition. As the competitive
struggle for scale among generalists marches forward, the
size and target breadth of the survivors increase, but the
combined resources held by all generalist organizations
declines somewhat (Carroll, 1985; Peli and Nooteboom,
1999). This implies that there is more space available for spe-
cialists (total market space minus the combined space of
generalistsl when concentration is higher (fewer and larger
generalistsl. As this space increases, the viability of specialist
organizations also increases, on average. The basic empirical
implication is an interaction effect between niche width and
concentration on mortality whereby specialist organizations
experience improved life chances. In other words, the main
niche-width effect of Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan (2001) is
reversed in concentrated markets:
Hypothesis 1 IH1): As market concentratIOn shifts from low to high,
the effect of niche width on an organization's hazard of mortality
shifts from negative to positive.
Resource-partitioning theory assumes a multidimensional
environmental resource space. Each dimension consists of
states or a smooth gradient of states, and organizations
experience the combination simultaneously.3 That is, every
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firm at every point in time is located within a particular region
of multidimensional environmental space. Within each dimen-
sion, resources are assumed to be unevenly distributed; the
joint distribution displays a unimodal peak representing what
is called "the market center" (Boone, Carroll, and van Wit-
teloostuijn, 2002). This means that some environmental areas
are more bountiful or lucrative than others, potentially provid-
ing scale advantages to those organizations located there.
The advantages may be overwhelming. So, in analyzing orga-
nizations in these contexts, it is imperative to attend to posi-
tion or location within the environmental space, as well as to
niche width. For example, specialists have great freedom in
choice of location; they can locate in the market center or
toward either end of the market. Generalists face more con-
straint in choice of location because a wide niche covers
much of the market; yet they can still choose whether to
locate the midpoint of their range near the center of the mar-
ket or toward one of the peripheries. Because of their broad-
er product scope, generalists are also more likely to possess
technological niches that spread over the market center. A
position in this resource-rich sector of the market provides
generalists with the potential to reap scale advantages, to
grow and expand further, which in turn makes them more
likely than other firms to be centrally located. So, the choices
of technological scope and market position are inextricably
related to scale, and they are mutually reinforcing. Some of
the benefits of being a generalist go hand in hand with scale
advantages that may arise partly from location in the part of
the market where the peaks in the dimensions of environ-
mental resources intersect. An organization's hazard of mor-
tality is therefore likely to increase as a function of the dis-
tance in its position away from the market center. This
prediction is consistent with resource-partitioning theory, in
which generalists occupying the market center are expected
to outcompete those operating in less appealing market seg-
ments.
The emergence of a center in a market with many producers
means that consumer preferences have become concentrat-
ed on a relatively narrow range, and this crowding in the cen-
ter is likely to affect the various kinds of organizations pre-
sent. The concentration of consumers at a center means that
producers who gain leadership in the center can grow very
large, usually exploiting economies of scale. The center's
attractiveness also intensifies competition among firms situ-
ated there, at least initially, as many producers seek to match
their products with consumer preferences. So, while we
expect that crowding will increase the mortality rates of orga-
nizations located in the center, we also expect that some
firms will locate away from this intensely competitive region.
Such effects should be especially pronounced for specialists
located in the center, whose assets are fully exposed to the
intense competition. In contrast, generalists whose niches
span the center can potentially offset some of the deleteri-
ous effects of crowding in the center with success in less
competitive regions covered by their wide niches. But for
both specialists and generalists, we expect that as the
resource-partitioning process unfolds, and concentration
rises, the heightened competition in the center will threaten
238/Asa, June zooz
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survival to an extent that overrides the positional advantages
of location in this most lucrative part of the market. So, we
expect another interaction effect:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): As market concentration shifts from low to high,
the effect of position away from the market center on an organIZa-
tion's hazard of mortality shifts from positive to negatIve.
Niche Dimensionality and the Evolution of Concentration
A difficulty of applying any niche theory to organizations is
the inherent multidimensionality of the niche. According to
Hannan and Freeman (1977: 947), the "(realized) niche of a
popUlation is defined as that area in constraint space (the
space whose dimensions are levels of resources, etc.) in
which the population outcompetes all other local populations.
The niche consists, then, of all those combinations of
resource levels at which the population can survive and
reproduce itself." There seems to be little debate about this
conception. Given this multidimensionality, any rule for mea-
suring niche width based on observable characteristics might
be incomplete. This seems more likely when niche-width
assessments use only a single dimension, as we did in this
study. Of course, one would always prefer to have a fuller
set of relevant niche-width measures, but data collection con-
straints are typically severe for historical populations and per-
haps even for contemporaneous ones (e.g., Freeman and
Hannan, 1983). And no matter how full the eventual set of
niche-width variables deployed, the possibility of incomplete-
ness remains.
We try to deal with this problem conceptually, by taking scale
into account. We recognize that the problematic cases only
occur when various dimensions of niche width reorder orga-
nizations relative to each other in terms of breadth. When
niche-width measures correspond across dimensions, incom-
pleteness presents no real problem-any measure is almost
as good as another, including those unobserved. Nonethe-
less, a single unobserved dimension that reclassifies a firm
from, say, a specialist into a generalist causes concern. For
example, a firm can be a specialist in terms of a single
dimension, say, product scope, and offer only a single prod-
uct. Yet in terms of other, potentially unobserved dimensions,
such as marketing outlets and use of advertising media, or
distribution channels, it can be a pronounced generalist.
Anheuser-Busch's dominance of the American beer market
with light lagers is one such example: its technologically nar-
row product base appeals to a range of socioeconomic and
demographic distributions of consumers, including those con-
stituting the bulk of the market. If a summary classification is
required when measuring both sets of characteristics, and
constructing a combined classification is not possible, then
Anheuser-Busch is best classified as a generalist. In our view,
the environmental resources on which organizations depend
should possess causal primacy over technological or other
strategic choices made by organizations in positioning them-
selves to secure those resources. This reasoning follows
directly from Hannan and Freeman's (1977, 19891 conception
of the niche and conforms with a long line of ecological theo-
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ry dating to Park (1936), McKenzie (19261. and Hawley
(19501.
In cases such as Anheuser-Busch, the main clue to the
important hidden niche dimension lies in its very large scale.
Although true specialists could grow very large, in order to do
so, enVIronmental resources must be unevenly distributed In
a way that precludes the kind of scale-based competition
among generalists discussed by Carroll and 5waminathan
(2000) and Dobrev and Carroll (2000) This implies that the
shape of the Joint resource distribution will be polymodal
(Dobrev, 2000). If, Instead, the resource distribution IS Uni-
modal, then very large size usually implies generalism on
some Important enVIronmental dimension. Although this
might seem highly problematic for research that does not
observe the dimenSion, It is not likely to be so, because gen-
eralist competition tends to be primarily scale-based. As long
as these very large firms are treated appropriately In the
analysIs as scale-based competitors, there should be linIe
fallout from an Incomplete dimensionalization of their niches.
The Situation for very small organizations IS qUite different.
There is little chance that a very small organization Will be
treated as a scale-based competitor in any analysis, raising
the question of what to do if it appears as a generalist on
observable niche-width characteristics. For example, on a
recent trip to Italy, we encountered a small shop that adver-
tised "everything for everybody" ("tutto per tutti"), an
avowedly generalist claim for a retailer. Casual inspection of
goods in the store gave the impression that the store offered
a wide variety of products for a diverse clientele. If that was
all there was to know, then we would have no choice but to
live with this classification. But given the very small size of
the store, we could not help but think that on some Impor-
tant underlying dimension of resource space, the store is a
specialist, perhaps an extreme specialist. Otherwise, as a
generalist, it would have been devoured by the intense scale
competition it would face. In this case, the store's location
Inside the central Milan train station is undoubtedly Impor-
tant, as are ItS longer-than-usual hours of operation.
In many contexts, It may not be possible to Infer the opera-
tive dimenSion at work for such chameleon-like small "gener-
alists." Moreover, there may be a number of such unob-
served dimensions operating In an organizational population,
making direct assessment for all cases ,nfeasible. For thiS
reason, It may make sense to regard very small size as
reflecting specialism on one or more unobserved dimensions
of specialism. So researchers choosing how to measure spe-
cialism may face an inherent conceptual trade-off either to
measure "pure" specialism along a single dimenSion or to
rely on small size as a way of Identifying both "pure" and
"mixed" (displaYing at once generalist and specialist charac-
teristics along different dimensions) specialist organizations.
If thiS approach is appropriate, then the behavior of very
small organizations should be similar to highly specialized
ones during resource-partitioning: their specialist Side should
put them in a favorable position in concentrated markets (per
H1). At the same time, the generalist traits of mixed special-
ists may potentially expose them to nonscale competition
240/Asa, June 2002
Evolution of Niches
from large generalists, like the competition for geographic
location mom-and-pop stores experienced during Wal-Mart's
early expansion in the rural American southwest. Empirically,
this means that predictions about the absolute fitness of very
small firms in concentrating markets are less appropriate
than for "pure" specialists. Instead, the noninvolvement of
very small firms in scale competition imparts a survival
advantage only in relation to larger generalist firms compet-
ing for the market center, yielding another expected interac-
tion effect:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): As market concentration shifts from low to high,
the hazard of mortality for a very small organization becomes lower
than that of Its larger counterparts in the organizational population.
High industry concentration often signals the partitioning of
the market space into two distinct segments, market center
and periphery, and this has implications for observed niche
width. While competitive intensity in the center subsides
once surviving generalists settle into their new and expanded
territories, specialist entry into the periphery reignites compe-
tition. The intensity of this competition may resemble that
typical of the formative years of the population. With the evo-
lution of market concentration, this process is replicated in
each developing market segment in which specialists seek to
advance. The effects of niche width and overlap density for
small organizations in concentrated markets, then, should be
the same as for early entrants competing for the center dur-
ing the formative years of the industry. In other words,
resource-partitioning processes may be cyclical (Carroll,
Dobrev, and Swaminathan, 2003). If resources in the periph-
eral niches eventually increase because of early specialists'
success at legitimating the niche products, then resource
competition will ensue in those niches. Just like early compe-
tition for resources in the market center, resource competi-
tion in the periphery is better fought by firms with broad nich-
es. So while the niche-width effect on mortality will change
from negative to positive in the market center, when high
concentration in the center leads to peripheral exploration, a
broad niche will continue to be advantageous to competitive
processes unfolding on the periphery.
Consequently, as the industry concentrates, the reversal of
the main niche-width effect is unlikely to affect very small
producers, because very small size in a scale-dominated
industry, as we argued in H3 above, invariably signifies spe-
cialism on at least one unobserved environmental dimension.
For very small firms, broad niche width does not imply scale,
and therefore need not incite a retaliatory response from
dominant generalists, but simply survival protection com-
pared with a company whose only product risks rejection by
the market. By the logic of these arguments, substantiated
by the historical examples, we expect that the niche-width
effect that occurs in unconcentrated markets will also hold
for small firms when overall industry concentration is high.
Empirically, this implies a three-way interaction effect:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): As market concentrallOn shifts from low to high,
the effect of niche width on a very small organlzallOn's hazard of
mortality shifts from positive to negative.
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Niche Overlap and Evolution of Concentration
Although numerous studies suggest that niche overlap corre-
sponds to competitive crowding, others show mutualistic
effects (see Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Hannan et aI., 19951.
The level of market concentration likely matters for the effect
of niche-overlap density, and considering it might help to sort
out such different findings. As industry structure develops
over time, identities and positions become defined and solidi-
fied (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and the patterns of organi-
zational interaction also gradually become embedded in the
evolving industry structure (Hannan, 1997). In concentrated
contexts, increases in niche-overlap density might reflect syn-
dicate and alliance formation among new partners, rather
than crowding by potential competitors.
There are three plausible reasons why firms might bond with
similar others. First, as sociological research on alliance for-
mation suggests, well-established firms with high reputations
typically scrutinize potential partners and generally avoid low-
or no-status firms for fear of damaging their own reputations
(Han, 1994; Podolny, 1994; Stuart, 20001. Accordingly, the
clustering of potential partners will likely occur among firms
ordered in proximity to one another on the status dimension.
In a concentrated market, alliance formation may occur most-
ly among large dominant generalists that have established
dominant positions in a consolidated industry.
Second, in addition to protecting their reputations, dominant
firms in a market with a resource-rich center may be prompt-
ed to collaborate rather than compete with one another in
order to preserve and reinforce the barriers defining the cen-
tral area. As the resource-partitioning model posits, growth in
the peripheral niches of the market is often an outcome of
the flattening of the distribution along relevant consumer
preferences (Carroll and Hannan, 1995). This process follows
from specialists' success in redefining consumer tastes in
their favor and thus threatens the positional advantage of
generalists. In response, dominant firms may unite against
the challenge of smaller competitors and use their economic
and social power to uphold the collective advantages of posi-
tion in the market center.
Third, dominant firms in a concentrated market also likely
compete in more than one technological arena. By definition,
generalists pursue something of a hedging strategy with
respect to the environment. Accordingly, those that have
won the late-stage battle for the market center position may
be more differentiated from one another than those smaller
generalists who competed against each other in the earlier
pre-resource-partitioning stage. This speculation rests on the
assumption that along with the niche-width expansion experi-
enced by surviving generalists comes an increased variability
in the ways they can prioritize among the various internal ini-
tiatives that stem from the different segments of their broad
niches.
As generalists become more different from one another,
interorganizational complementarities likely increase, thereby
yielding more opportunities for alliance formation (Nohria and
Garcia-Pont, 19911. Recent examples include the joint effort
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of the Big Three U.S. automobile firms to battle unfavorable
industry regulations on emissions standards, the recent mar-
keting slant in the largest macro-breweries ad campaigns col-
lectively countering the micro-brewery movement's claim of
superior quality, and Microsoft's investment in Apple, justified
by the expectation of greater software sales even at the cost
of keeping a formidable competitor in the operating systems
market. This reasoning is informed by research on multimar-
ket overlap showing that market differentiation increases
growth rates (Haveman and Nonnemaker, 20001 and
improves survival chances iBaum and Korn, 19961 in concen-
trated industries. We extend this argument here by proposing
that within a single concentrated industry, relations of mutu-
alism develop among the dominant incumbents. The market
rationale for this behavior has been studied exhaustively by
economists who point out that there is a strong disincentive
for any competitor to engage in a competitive behavior tar-
geted at other incumbents, like starting a price war, in a mar-
ket in which other competitors have sufficient market power
to retaliate swiftly by adopting the same or another equally
pointed tactic.
But there is also a social rationale for the evolving partner-
ships among firms in consolidated markets, given that social
ties are likely to develop among the corporate executives of
dominant firms. The high visibility and scrutiny to which such
high-level managers are exposed makes them identifiable not
just with their firms but with the industry as a whole. At that
level, they share concerns about public perceptions and
accountability, as well as industrywide developments related
to regulatory changes, globalization, consumer attitudes, and
the like. Moreover, their positions at the helm of powerful
organizations place them in similar and highly selective and
exclusive circles of the social elite. Additionally, career pro-
gression in a concentrated industry implies limited choice of
interorganizational transfers, so ties to former coworkers eas-
ily translate into ties with current competitors. In short.
shared concerns and personal ties may subdue the dynamic
of direct competition in concentrated and partitioned mar-
kets. Metaphorically, once the pie has been cut, it is in every-
one's interest to protect it. Overall, then, we expect the dele-
terious effect of niche-overlap density on survival chances in
a fragmented market to be countered by the beneficial effect
of firms' common position in a well-defined, established,
structured region of the market, namely, the market center in
a concentrated industry.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): As market concentration shifts from low to high,
the effect of niche-overlap density on an organization's hazard of
mortality shifts from positive to negative.
The process differs for specialists exploring and redefining
the peripheral niches of the market. Industry concentration
consolidates the market center and subjects the scale com-
petitors operating within its boundaries to various institutional
and regulatory pressures. But the edges of the resource
space witness the entry of specialized producers who bet
their chances on the distinct appeal of their products, which
allows them to avoid competition. If this strategy fails, then
the competitive intensity to which they become subjected is
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essentially resource-based and increases with the number of
direct competitors. Under such conditions, the effect of
niche-overlap density is the same as for early entrants com-
peting for the center during the formative years of the
industry.
Conceptualizing this argument as a testable proposition
directs attention to the previously discussed alternative
means of measuring specialism: along a single technological
dimension or by considering small size as a proxy to identify
all (including mixedl specialists on multiple dimensions. It
seems unreasonable to expect that the competitive process
among specialists will be based solely on technology or prod-
uct range. The small scale of production on which specialists
typically rely precludes them from competing across a broad
geographic domain. In fact, small-scale organizations often
serve customers in different geographic regions, so overlap
in technology need not inevitably fuel competition. For exam-
ple, Climber Motor Corp. of Little Rock, Arkansas, did not
compete with Commonwealth Motors Co. of Juliet, Illinois,
even though both companies specialized in producing mostly
economy-type cars in the early 1920s: both companies
lacked the resources and the supplier and distributor net-
works necessary to offer their products in each other's mar-
ket. By contrast, Commonwealth, ancestor of the Checker
taxi, did compete in its market with Stutz Motor Co., which
operated a short distance away in Indianapolis, Indiana. So, in
arguing that the reversal of the overlap-density effect (H5)
does not apply to specialist organizations, we again use very
small size to reflect specialism, so as to capture the essence
of our argument in a way that the technology/product-based
measure of specialism does not. Accordingly, we predict:
Hypothesis 6 (H6): As market concentration shifts from low to high,
the effect of niche-overlap denSity on a very small organIzation's
hazard of mortality shifts from negative to positive.
Summary: Evolution of Concentration
Our analysis develops arguments about the ecology of an
organizational niche in an evolutionary context. At a general
level, we take basic theoretical predictions about niches and
qualify them by stage of evolution. In a nutshell, we theorize
that the effects of niche width, niche position, relative scale,
and niche overlap change as the industry consolidates. Table
1 summarizes the general logic of the hypotheses, which
develop an evolutionary account of niche processes based on
market concentration. During the formative years of an indus-
try when concentration is low, niche width and position in the
resource-rich market center should confer competitive advan-
tage. Firms that choose to use their profits from scale to
expand the firm's scope rather than to build a cost advantage
succeed in dominating the market center by eliminating
smaller generalists and driving concentration high. This drive
to dominance by large established generalists spells doom
for newcomer generalist firms IH 11 seeking to advance to the
copious center (H21. Instead, consolidation triggers explo-
ration of the periphery, where small specialist firms have a
better chance of surviving on previously uncontested terrain
(H1 and H31. Although small specialists do not compete on
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Table 1
Summary of Hypotheses: Evolutionary Processes Triggered by the Shift from Low to High Industry
Concentration
Organizational feature
Niche width
Distance from market center
Small size
Niche width x Small size
Nlche-overlap denSIty
Nlche-overlap density x Small sIze
Change in effect on mortality
with rising concentration
Negative ---io poSItIve
Positive -+ negative
Positive but weaker than for larger firms
PoSItive -+ negative
Positive -+ negative
Negative ---io positive
Hypothesis
Hl
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
4
Our dataset does not include Japanese
manufacturers because the first Interna-
tional automaker to start production In the
U_S was Honda, which opened Its
Marysville. OhiO, plant in 1982, a year
after our data window closes Most of
the cars manufactured In Japan and sold
in the US pnor to 1981 were marketed
under the brands of Amencan producers
thiS was the case with lsuzu, which
began manufactUring the Opel for Gener-
al Motors In 1976, and MltsublShi, which
started producing the Dodge Coil for
Chrysler In 197'
scale, they still benefit from variation in product offerings,
which eliminates dependence on a single product (H41. The
initially deleterious effect of overlap in the niche should trans-
form into an advantage as market leaders realize the need to
cooperate in a mature industry, where identities and struc-
tures are solidified (H5). As rising concentration solidifies the
market center, the door opens for specialists to pursue posi-
tional advantages by differentiation. But if differentiation is
not sustainable, small firms too will engage in competition for
resources. In that case, the relative resource scarcity in the
periphery will amplify the deleterious effect of niche crowd-
ing for specialists (H6). Empirically, the rising market concen-
tration should lead to a reversal in the main effects of niche
width, market position, and overlap density (H1, H2, and H51.
But for small specialists, the effect of niche width turns neg-
ative and that of overlap density turns positive because the
rising overall industry concentration presents these firms
with an opportunity to operate in the unconcentrated market
periphery (H4 and H6).
METHODS
We report here analyses of data on all American automobile
producers ever known to operate from 1885 to 1981.4 These
data derive from a larger collection effort that coded histories
of automobile manufacturers worldwide, using reports of
automobile historians and collectors (Hannan et aI., 1995;
Carroll and Hannan, 19951. The most comprehensive informa-
tion comes from a multivolume encyclopedic source book
that provides thorough authoritative coverage: the Standard
Catalogue of American Cars (Gunnell, Schrimpf, and Buttolph,
1987; Flamang, 1989; Kimes and Clark, 1996; Kowalke,
1997). Supplementary information for recent periods can also
be found in Kutner (1974) and Automotive News (1993).
The major sources organize their reports around" marques,"
or product models, not firms. For instance, although Kimes
and Clark's (1996) volume does not contain an entry for Gen-
eral Motors, it does contain entries for Chevrolet, Cadillac,
Buick, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, and other marques produced at
various times by General Motors. To create records for firms,
our unit of analysis, we aggregated entries for all of a firm's
various marques across time. The records contain informa-
tion about spells of automobile production by firms but not
about their complete lifetimes, which sometimes involved
operation in another industry before and/or after a spell of
automobile production. In some cases, the sources do tell
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about the creation and destruction of the firms. Insofar as the
sources permit. we reconstructed the organizational histories
of the firms in these industries. The collection effort revealed
an abundance of firms. We found data on 2,197 American
automakers, many of them small, short-lived, and obscure
firms that introduced highly novel automobile designs and
production schemes.
Mortality Events
Organizational life histories end in a variety of ways. For
American automobile firms, the most important events asso-
ciated with the ending of an observed life history involve one
of the following: (1) disbanding of the firm; (2) exit to another
industry; or (3) merger or acquisition by another firm. Dis-
banding means that the firm failed as a collective actor. In
automobile manufacturing, exit to another industry also sug-
gests a lack of success. The other ending events are harder
to interpret. Although merger and acquisition both result in
the loss of at least one independent collective actor, firms
merge and acquire for diverse reasons. Sometimes a firm
flounders, and its owners seek to recover some fraction of
their investment by selling the firm. In other cases, a thriving
firm's competencies command great value from potential
acqulrers or merger partners. Because of the ambiguous
meaning of mergers and acquisitions, we based our analysis
on disbanding and exit to another industry.
The sources do not report exactly what happened to most
firms when they dropped from the set of producers, especial-
ly when spells of automobile production were short and
when the scale of production was tiny. Apparently, automo-
bile historians rarely could reconstruct the details about an
exit unless a firm had become reasonably well established.
Knowledge that a certain firm disbanded, was acquired, or
left the industry usually means that it persisted in the indus-
try long enough that its exit event received notice in the
press. Our reading of the historical materials for the U.S.
industry indicates that most exits of unknown type were
either disbandings or exits to other industries, so we treated
these two events alike: the outcome event of interest in this
analysis is disbanding/exit to another industry, defined to
include events of unknown type. Firms known to have ended
by other events (merger, acquisition, etc.) were treated as
(noninformatively) censored on the right at the times of these
events, per standard practice in event-history analysis.
Organizational tenure. We followed convention in modeling a
firm's tenure (u) in a particular organizational population rather
than its organizational age (of course, industry tenure equals
organizational age for de novo firms!. When dates of entry
and exit are exact or nearly exact, tenure in automobile pro-
duction can be calculated straightforwardly, but archival
sources vary in their precision in dating events. Sometimes
the sources give the exact date; other times, they give only
the month/year, season/year, or only the year. To make analy-
sis tractable, we converted all of the information about timing
to decimal years. Year-only dates were coded as occurring at
the midpoint of the year. In this case, our coding rules assign
the starting time to the middle of the first year and the end-
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ing time to the midpoint of the next year, giving a completed
tenure of one year, which is the expected tenure under the
assumption of a uniform distribution. These rules, which are
consistent with Petersen's (19911 recommendations for deal-
ing with the problem of time aggregation, generalize to han-
dle all the cases we encountered.
Some firms' records indicated that they conducted other
activities prior to entering the automobile market. Because
these de alio firms likely entered with greater resource bases
than de novo firms, we included a dummy variable to indicate
prior existence (prior existence). Carroll et al. (1996) showed
that this variable is associated initially with lower mortality
risks.
We specified the effects of organizational density (N) nonmo-
notonically, consistent with established theory and findings in
organization ecology (Carroll and Hannan, 20001. to include a
linear and second-order term of annual counts of the number
of producer organizations. We also included a fixed covariate
for each firm measuring density at the time of its founding
(density at entry). Following Hannan (1997), we interacted
the effects of the contemporaneous density variables with a
set of variables measuring the age of the population (industry
age). This specification allows the effects of density to vary
as a function of population age.
We measured organizational size as scale of operations,
specifically, the firm's annual production of automobiles. We
analyzed the main effects of size on firm mortality by using
the natural logarithm of this value, Ln(SizeJ. Following previ-
ous analyses of automobile populations (Hannan et aI.,
1998a, 1998b), we also measured the relative size of a firm
as the ratio of each firm's size to the size of the largest firm
in the national population at the time (relative sizel. The use
of this variable coupled with the absolute size measure
allowed us to parse out the absolute size effects. Negative
(absolute) size dependence occurs because large firms have
a greater capacity to produce new knowledge (through
greater R&D expenditures), to extract value through efficien-
cies and complementarities stemming from an elaborate divi-
sion of labor, and to benefit from economies of learning,
managerial skills, etc. These are advantages that large firms
would enjoy even if no small firms existed in the industry. By
contrast, relative size only relates to advantages like scale
and position derived by large firms vis-a-vis their smaller com-
petitors. Further, while the absolute-size effect captures the
advantages of large organizations, small organizations have
higher failure rates not only because they lack these advan-
tages but also because their thin resource supplies imply nar-
row margins of error and thus make them extremely vulnera-
ble to market uncertainty (Levinthal, 1991). To capture this
compounded absolute-small-size disadvantage, we used a
dummy variable for size less than or equal to an annual pro-
duction of 50 cars (size';; 5Cli.
Market concentration. Variations in the industry size distribu-
tion that may give rise to the emergence of structure and
market partitioning are captured by our measure of market
concentration. We relied on the frequently used concentra-
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tion-ratio measure, defined as the ratio of the annual produc-
tion of the four largest firms to the total industry output for
that year (C4). For our analysis, this measure has an advan-
tage over other concentration measures because it captures
well the process of consolidation in the market center, where
only a few firms are able to dominate, which has been the
case in the U.S. automobile industry. The measure implies
that as the combined market share of the top four industry
firms increases, concentration increases proportionately. It
also implies that if the market in any given year consists of
four or fewer producers, concentration will equal one, even if
production is evenly divided among them. This is not a con-
cern in our analysis, however, because we used two other
size-based measures to account for positional and scale dif-
ferences among individual firms: relative size and scale com-
petition (described below).
Organizational ecologists have pointed to a pattern of density
evolution that holds across a wide range of industries, includ-
ing the U.S. automobile industry: the number of organizations
initially grows slowly until the form acquires taken-for-grant-
edness, causing density after that point to increase steeply
(Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Carroll and Hannan, 2000). As the
carrying capacity of the population is reached and competi-
tion sets in, the number of firms decreases, reflecting the
consolidation of the market. The subsequent entry of special-
ists leads to a modest resurgence of density in scale-domi-
nated industries. One important implication of this density
pattern for interpreting variation in concentration is that the
slow increase in the number of firms in the early years of the
industry confines our measure of concentration to equal 1
until at least five firms are present on the market. Because
our thesis rests on the argument that rising concentration
solidifies industry structure, and because high market con-
centration in the very early years of the industry clearly does
not signify this theorized process, we estimated models in
which we controlled for the effect of high concentration dur-
ing that initial period.
Scale competition. Scale economies exert their force in orga-
nizational evolution because of the worsened consequences
likely experienced by small firms with relatively higher costs
in competition with larger firms. The competitive pressure
varies depending on where a firm sits in the size distribution
relative to its competitors. This pressure can be modeled by
examining the size structure of the competitive environment
faced by each scale competitor at any point in time (Carroll
and Swaminathan, 2000; Dobrev and Carroll, 2000). Examin-
ing the exact position of each scale competitor in relation to
its peers reveals not only the extent of its economic advan-
tage related to lower cost but also indicates political and insti-
tutional advantages derived from special treatment from poli-
cymakers and regulators. The selection mechanism proposed
by the scale-competition model has been shown to operate
consistently among firms in industries as diverse as macro-
brewers (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000) and automobile
producers in Europe and the US. (Dobrev and Carroll, 2000).
Although the logic of the theory easily generalizes to all mar-
kets and industries in which incumbents compete on scale,
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In our View, these are conservative cutoff
POints that do not exclude many small
firms perhaps not subject to strong scale
pressure. More generally, although the
pool of scale competitors identIfied in any
industry charactenzed by scale competi-
tion should conform to the same dynam-
ics predicted by our model of scale-based
selection, the cutoff POint used to identify
scale competitors should be industry spe-
cifiC and derived from the particular pro-
ductIOn system, minimum efficient scale.
and other industry-specific Idiosyncrasies
Nevertheless, we perlormed sensitivity
analyses to assure the robustness of our
results based on a cutoff of less than or
equal to 50 production units, We estimat-
ed two additional models In the first one,
we counted all firms in calculating the
scale-selection measure. In thiS case. the
estimated aggregate distance coefficient
displayed a significant negative effect;
thiS IS in line WIth our theory, which sug-
gests that very small firms (included in
thiS operatlonalization of the variablel
actually benefit from intensified rivalry
among scale competitors In the second
model. we raised the size cutoff POint
from 50 to 500, thus wrongfully excludmg
many firms from the pool of scale com-
petitors. Not surpnslngly, the estimated
coeffiCient for the aggregate distance
measure was weaker and not significant,
because many firms that were both sub-
Ject to and exerted scale-selection pres-
sure on their peers were not counted In
the model
6
Using senSitivity analYSIS, we determined
which functIOnal specificatIOn of the
aggregate distance vanable resulted m
the best model fit. We expenmented With
two other speclflcallons, representing the
downward sloping curve as (S~ - Sm"r12
and as (S~ - $........ )-1 115. The fit of either of
these alternative specifications was Inferi-
or to a model usmg the inverse quadratIC
specification, which we ultimately select-
ed
Evolution of Niches
heterogeneity in the nature of competitors (i.e., the simulta-
neous existence of both scale and non-scale producersl
requires an analysis of the industry-specific scale threshold
and cost structure to identify those firms engaged in scale
competition, which is not a straightforward task. Ideally, one
would use data on both supply (e.g., production capacity,
level of utilization, cost structure) and demand le.g., existing
and prospective customer base per model, per company, per
yearl market characteristics to classify firms. In a situation
likely to be common among researchers, we did not have
such detailed data, so we developed an alternative.
We used a size threshold to identify the subset of scale com-
petitors, following Dobrev and Carroll (20001, who demon-
strated that, in fact, U.S. autofirms with annual production of
less than or equal to 50 cars conform to a different schedule
of mortality and respond differently to industry
consolidation. 5 We also used this cutoff point to identify the
subset of large firms likely to experience scale-based selec-
tion. For these firms, we used the scale competition variable
developed by Carroll and Swaminathan (20001 and Dobrev
and Carroll (20001 and measured the aggregate distance of all
larger firms from the focal firm. To calculate it, we first found
each firm's position at each point in time on a downward
sloping curve represented by the inverse quadratic root of
the size variable S, aher adjusting for minimum size" The cal-
culation is given by (S" - Sm,n)-'/4; the curve generated by this
equation resembles the general long-run average cost curve
posited by economic theory for economies of scale. After
locating firms' positions on the curve, we then computed the
aggregate distance of each firm i from its larger competitors
by summing the differences in scores as:
5 I .. - D - ~ (5 - 5 )-114 - (5 - 5 )-114ca e competition - (\ - (I min jt mm .
s~ > •
As the formula indicates, the greater the number of larger
competitors a firm faces, the greater the competitive pres-
sure it confronts, all other things being equal. The contribu-
tion of each larger firm to its competitive pressure depends
on the firm's exact location. When the focal firm is small,
then a unit size difference creates more pressure than when
it is large. Put another way, the same difference in scale
between two firms generates more competitive pressure for
the smaller firm when its absolute size is small than when its
absolute size is large.
Niche profile variables. Following Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan
(2001), we defined technological niche width INlM as the
range of engine capacity in terms of horsepower across all
models produced by each firm at any given point in time (a
realized nichel. By this view, producers define themselves by
choosing an array of products. Specialists offer products with
a small range of variation on the dimension; generalists dis-
playa broad range. For example, the specialist Bartholomew
Co. of Peoria, Illinois, in 1919 offered a single model (the
Glide, with engine horsepower of 45), and the more general-
ist South Bend, Indiana-based Studebaker Corp. in 1953
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made cars with engines ranging from 147 to 270 horsepow-
er Measurement of niche width in this way implies that a
firm is capable of producing engines (and bears the costs of
productionl for all values within its range, whether it actually
does or not. Combining the technological niches of all exist-
ing firms in any given year produces a picture of the market
boundaries in technological space at any point in time. The
evolution of the technological space in which U.S. auto man-
ufacturers operated between 1885 and 1981 is presented in
figure 1.
Niche overlap density (NOI is the count of firms whose nich-
es overlap with the niche of the focal firm. Although there
are different ways to compute niche overlap, we chose to
use a density measure because it is a better fit with our
hypotheses. A more complex alternative would have been to
weigh the overlaps based on the portion of the niche that
overlaps with that of competitors IBaum and Singh, 19941.
The market center covers the range of the niches of the four
largest firms in the industry. This measure of the market cen-
ter follows the logic of the concentration measure described
above. If the four largest firms in the industry provide a
telling example of the level of concentration, then the range
of their niches should provide an adequate description of the
most resource-abundant segment in the market, where the
dominant players position themselves. We used the midpoint
of a firm's technological product range to indicate its niche
position in the market. The midpoint might be used to mark
position lor location) whenever niche width on a focal dimen-
Figure 1. Technological bounds of the U.S. automobile market. 1885-1981.
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sion can be represented as a continuous variable and the dis-
tribution of a firm's capabilities across the range of the niche
is symmetrical. Distance away from the market center is the
difference between the midpoint of the focal firm's niche and
the midpoint of the market center. We estimated the effects
of the distances of firms both" above" the market center
(position: DAMq, meaning a niche width that contains a larg-
er engine capacity than the center, and "below" the market
center (position: DBMq.
Measuring organizational niches along a single dimension-
technological scope, in our case-has its limitations. If our
measures of niche width and overlap density capture only
market position and competitive dynamics in technological
space, then they would be less than ideal for testing the the-
oretical propositions stated in the previous section. But defin-
ing organizational niches along a technology dimension has
compensating advantages. Most important, it provides us
with a means of making meaningful comparisons of firms
that have existed in disparate historical periods, allowing us
to analyze the evolution of the industry from its origins. It
makes it possible to draw as complete a picture as possible
(given the paucity of information for many of the entries in
our datasetl of the overall market niches of the automobile
firms whose fates we analyze. We think that technological
niches in this industry are informative about market position
because, upon examination, the choice of engine capacity
made by automobile producers over the years reveals not
only the ranges of their technological offerings but also these
firms' strategies in product marketing and competitive pric-
ing, customer segment targeting, supply-chain management,
and innovation. Some examples, drawn from the historical
materials we used, illustrate these points. Indicative of the
tight coupling between engine capacity and product design
was the new Cadillac model General Motors (GM) introduced
in 1934; it extended GM's technological niche further. The
16-cylinder, 185-horsepower engine came packed in a luxuri-
ous body style in which "the wheelbase was stretched to a
mammoth 154 inches making the Cadillac America's lengthi-
est production car.... The bodies were elegant and included
the striking and provocatively named Madame X" (Kimes and
Clark, 1996: 200). Evidently, GM not only built a more power-
ful engine to propel a fashionably styled car but also used it
as an occasion to spice up its marketing effort. Pricing strate-
gies, too, have always been closely tied to the variation in
engine capacity. For example, between 1902 and 1910, Knox,
based in Springfield, Massachusetts, transitioned from selling
a 5-horsepower runabout (affectionately called "Old Porcu-
pine") in the $1,000 price range to offering a 60-horsepower
limousine priced for as much as $6,400.
The technological niche also reflects a firm's competitive
market strategy. For example, at a time when other compa-
nies were aspiring to prove the universal nature of their prod-
uct by competing in road races and hill climbs, Detroit Elec-
tric "was always careful to insist that its product was not a
touring car.... It was an urban vehicle, one for women dri-
vers especially" (Kimes and Clark, 1996: 444). This narrOw-
niche manufacturer appealed to a then-small customer seg-
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ment by relying on what we would categorically describe as
a specialist strategy. Variations in technological product offer-
ings also relate well to intangible strategic resources such as
reputational benefits. Industry historians continue to debate if
Packard's move into the lower end of the market resulted "in
a loss of prestige to the Packard luxury car image from which
the company never recovered" (Kimes and Clark, 1996:
1106). Our reading of the data sources also suggests that in
many cases the adoption of a new technology had profound
repercussions not only for the overall image of the company
but for its internal scope and design, shifting firm boundaries
both vertically and horizontally: "In 1911 Sterns became a
distinctive car of another kind when the firm acquired the
first American license to the Knight engine" (Kimes and
Clark, 1996: 1388). This event not only had a profound impact
on the company's range of models with varying engine
capacity but also necessitated a subsequent acquisition of a
factory specifically dedicated to the production of the Knight
engine.
Socioeconomic environmental factors. We also controlled for
socioeconomic environmental conditions. The estimates
reported below are from specifications that include effects of
economic depression Idepression year dummies), the level of
the gross domestic product IGOA adjusted for inflation
Itaken from Maddison, 1991}, and dummy period effects rep-
resenting industry regimes Imass production, product differ-
entiation, JITrrQCi as defined by Womack, Jones, and Roos
11990). We excluded the years of the Second World War
from the analysis because the production of motor vehicles
for private use was minimized for the duration of the war in
the U.S. This specification of socioeconomic environmental
factors parallels those of Hannan et al. (1998a, 1998bl and
allows for precise model comparisons.
Model Specification and Estimation
We represented variation in organizational tenure lui as a sto-
chastic piecewise-exponential function where the breakpoints
for the pieces are denoted as a S 7, S 7, S ... S 7 p. Assuming
that 7 p+, =~, there are P periods: lp = {u I7 pSuS 7 p+,}, P =
1, "', P. After examining life tables and exploring estimates
of a variety of choices for the breakpoints, we decided to
break the duration scale (in years) at 0.5, 1.0,3.0, and 7.0.
With this choice, the first segment 10,0.51 includes dated
events that occur within the first six months in the industry
and cases that enter and exit at unknown times within the
same year, as discussed above. The second segment 10.5,11
includes dated events that occur within the second six
months and cases that enter at an unknown time in one year
and exit at an unknown time in the next year. The third and
fourth segments are defined similarly. The final segment
begins at seven years and is open on the right.
We built cumulatively on previous findings to estimate a uni-
fied model of organizational evolution. These findings include
specifications of tenure dependence, size dependence, and
density dependence ICarroll et aI., 1996; Hannan et aI.,
1998a, 1998b) and scale competition IDobrev and Carroll,
20001 Given the complexity of the ideas in the hypotheses
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and the models, we do not dwell on estimates of each of
these effects but simply report them. Their inclusion, howev-
er, is central to our claims of building a unified model.
In modeling organizational mortality in the U.S. and other
automobile industries, Hannan et al. 11998al explored a non-
proportional rate model for combining size and tenure
effects. In simple terms, the nonproportionality facet of the
model allows the effects of size and tenure to interact in
complex ways by yielding different coefficients for size
effects at various tenure segments. Hannan et al.'s 11998al
estimates showed that the assumption of proportionality of
the effects of size does not fit well the histories of popula-
tions of automobile manufacturers in major countries of
Europe and in the U.S. That is, allowing nonproportional
effects statistically improves model fit, even after taking into
account changes in the degrees of freedom. We used the
specification here when it improved fit. To be more precise,
we specify that the disbanding/exit rate fL, is a function of
tenure in the industry lui, industry age (tl. a vector of vari-
ables (s',ul pertaining to size labsolute and relative size,
aggregate distance from larger competitors, and dummy for
very small sizel, a vector of other measured covariates (x',1
including GNp, depression year, and density at founding, a
function of contemporaneous density and density squared, as
well as the interactions of these density effects and industry
age, denoted by q>(N"tI. The functions for assessing the argu-
ments made in the hypotheses relate to niche width (NWI.
market position (POSI, niche overlap density (NO), and con-
centration IC4), denoted by ljIINW", NO,u' POS,u,C4,). The gen-
eral class of models we estimate has the form:
1..l)U,tl = exp(mp) exp(s'luo.p + X'tn}' l.p(Nt,t)·
tjI(NW",NO",POS,u' C4,1. u E Ip
Here mp denotes a set of tenure-specific effects; the log-lin-
ear link imposes the constraint that the baseline hazards be
non-negative. The (tenure) period subscript on the vector of
size coefficients indicates that we allowed some of these
effects to vary by tenure. This general specification sets the
hazard of disbanding/exiting to be a nonproportional function
of tenure and these covariates. In basic tests of the hypothe-
ses, we estimated models with this general form with the
method of maximum likelihood as implemented in TDA 5.7
(Rohwer, 1994; Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995).
Specifying empirical tests for each of the hypotheses
required that we model interaction effects between industry
concentration and each of the organizational variables perti-
nent to the specific hypothesis. In each case, interpreting the
effect requires combining the effect of the main term with
the effect of the interaction term. For example, to confirm
H1, we need to show that the niche-width effect becomes
positive when concentration rises; the relevant effect con-
sists of the baseline niche-width effect and the interaction
effect between niche width and industry concentration.
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Table 2 presents the basic descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables in the event-history file, and the sequence of models in
tables 3 and 4 build on each other to yield tests of the
hypotheses. The estimates from a baseline specification
appear in the first column of table 3 (model 11, which repli-
cates all but one of the main findings of Hannan et al. (1998a,
1998bl. The effect of tenure on the rate is U-shaped,
decreasing the hazard during the first seven years but revers-
ing direction from that point on. In addition to the beneficial
effect of relative size, the nonproportional effect of absolute
size suggests that its negative effect on the hazard increases
with industry tenure. Meanwhile, the deleterious effect of
very small size seems to wear off after the firm's seventh
year in the industry. Industry concentration shows a positive
but only marginally significant baseline effect on the rate. The
estimates of the main effects of density and its interactions
with industry age all agree with the predictions of density
dependence; all density coefficients except one are highly
significant. The positive and statistically significant effect of
density at entry on the hazard supports the density delay
argument.
Modell departs from the models of Hannan et al. (1998a,
1998bl in that it includes the concentration variable. We put it
in all our specifications because of the central role it plays in
the hypotheses. Inclusion of this variable in the baseline
model 1 weakens the negative effect of the very-small-size
dummy in the late-tenure period (after seventh year), which
was statistically significant in the earlier studies. Per H3, this
variable may have lost its statistical power because model 1
is not fully specified: the very-small-size dummy must be
interacted with concentration in order to show its effect once
a main effect of concentration is included. So, to understand
the action in the variables in this specification before moving
to the more specific niche-based variables, we begin hypoth-
esis testing by turning to this size-based measure of special-
ism first and the predictions of H3.
Model 2 shows the estimates of the baseline model with the
added interaction of small size and concentration. For consis-
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in life-History Spell File
Variable Min. Max. Mean S.D.
Density (N) 1.00 345.00 204.90 109.55
DenSity at entry 1.00 345.00 224.87 106.44
Ln (SIze + .1) -2.30 15.48 3.12 3.48
Relative size (x 10-3) 0.00 5284.50 35.55 284.97
Size :5 50 (dummy) 0.00 1.00 0.68 0.47
Prior existence (dummy) 0.00 1.00 0.57 0.50
GNP 42.40 977.10 200.10 221.07
Niche Width (NW) 0.01 552.01 12.93 3209
Niche-overlap density (NO) 0.00 362.00 86.12 82.75
POSition: distance above market center (DAMe) 0.00 206.50 3.95 9.89
POSition: distance below market center (DBMe) 000 364.25 16.95 33.02
Change In relative position 0.00 275.02 5.18 1179
Industry concentration (C4) 0.31 1.00 0.65 0.21
Scale competition x (Size> 50) 0.00 59.92 1.06 3.43
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Table 3
Effects of Population Density, Size land Size-related Variables) on the
Disbanding/Exit Hazard of U.S. Automobile Manufacturers, 1885-1981*
Variable
Industry tenure and poor expeoence
Tenure in the Industry
u < 0.5
0.5 ~ u < 1
1:Su<3
3:Su<7
u:2:7
Prior existence
Socioeconomic mdustrlal environment
Mass production
Production differentiation
JIT /TOC
DepressIon year
GNP
Density and popularlon agmg
DenSIty at entry
N
N2 (x 10 .....)
N x Ind. age ix 10 -3)
N2 x Ind. age (x 10 -5)
N x Ind. age2 (x 10 .....)
N2 x Ind. age2 (x 10--6)
Organizational size-based measures
Ln (Size)
u<7
u 2: 7
Slze:5 50
u < 7
u>7
Aelatlve size (x 10 -3)
Industry concentration (C4)
Evolutionary processes:
Scale competition x Size> 50
C4 x SIZe $ 50
Number of spells/events
Number of parameters
LA Test
Log-likelihood
Model 1
-1.171-3.111
-1.27 1-3.361
-1.77 1-4.691
-2.001-5.261
-1.52 1-3.091
-0.11 1-2381
0.79 14.691
0.38 11.701
-0.06 1-0.161
-0.20 1-3.001
-0.0011-1.201
0.00214.341
-0.01 1-1.951
0.49 12.151
0.43 11.531
-0.401-2.571
-0.121-2.741
0.09 13.101
-0.14 1-5.221
-0.19 1-3.531
0.66 13.851
-0.11 1-0.351
-0.02 1-2.231
0.66 11.711
8892/2051
24
-3680.6
Model 2
-2.64 1-5.221
-2.74 1-5.421
-3.24 1-6.401
-3.46 1-6831
-3.24 1-5.281
-0.11 1-2.391
0.77 14.621
0.41 11.821
-0.09 1-0.271
-0.22 1-3.171
-0.0011-1.351
0.002 13.601
-0.01 1-1.561
0.39 11.711
0.34 11.211
-0.33 1-2.141
-0.10 1-2.431
008 12.721
-0.12 1-4.251
-0.15 1-2.681
222 15.571
1.70 13.351
-0.03 1-2.451
2.44 14.131
0.03 13.031
-1.94 1-3.941
8892/2051
26
23.2
Ivs. model 11
-3669.0
.. T-statlstlcs are In parentheses; u denotes tenure In the Industry.
tency with Dobrev and Carroll (20001, we also included the
interaction of the scale competition term and a dummy for
the firms to which it applies. The predicted effects of inter-
est, concentration by very small size, are plotted in figure 2.
The estimated main effect implies that high concentration
increases the rate more than ten times for relatively large
firms, but only by about half for very small firms. As expect-
ed, small size does not completely eliminate the detrimental
effect brought about by consolidation but as the diverging
lines in the figure illustrate, it provides a buffer against this
effect that increases as concentration rises. Small size per-
forms the function of a shield against scale competition,
which significantly decreases the survival chances of large
(but not the largest) firms. Also, the addition of the interac-
tion term between concentration and small size in model 2
streamlines the main effect of concentration, which in this
255/ASO, June 2002
Figure 2. Concentration effect (by size) on the failure rate of U.S. auto manufacturers. 188~1981,
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Because concentratIOn In the beginning
of the Industry was high but did not rep-
resent the processes we are InvestIgating
here, we needed to estimate If this partial
concentration effect was affecting the
robustness of our results. We did so by
adding an interaction term between
industry concentration and a pre-1905
dummy to the model In table 4 Including
this additIOnal parameter did not affect
the rest of the estimates: Its effect was
statistically Insignificant, and model fit did
not Improve. Consequently, we conclude
that our model IS not misspeclfied as a
result of the U·shaped pattern of concen·
tratlon
model becomes stronger and statistically significant. So, in
accord with predictions of resource partitioning, scale-based
selection, and si2e-locali2ed competition theories, we find
that while concentration increases the ha2ard, this effect is
mitigated by very small si2e.
Technological Niche Width and Position
Table 4 shows the results of a complete model specification
including the relevant niche-width and overlap-density-related
variables' The interaction effects between the niche-width
variables and industry concentration in model 3 show that, as
predicted by H1 and H2, the directions of the main effects
reverse. When interacted with industry concentration, the
effect of niche width changes from negative to positive, and
the effects of position distance from the market center
change from positive to negative. All coefficients are signifi-
cant, except for position in the high end of the market center.
The niche-width and the low-end-position (DBMCI effects are
presented graphically in figures 3 and 4, respectively. For
niche width, concentration not only stifles the main effect but
altogether transforms broad niche into a liability for survival.
According to the results and figure 4, as the market concen-
trates, position in the low periphery (i.e., away from the mar-
ket centerl proves beneficial to the extent that it confers sur-
vival advantage to firms located there relative to
market-center competitors. But we did not find, as implied by
H2, that there is an absolute gain associated with peripheral
position under high concentration: the ha2ard does not
become a decreasing function of distance from the market
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Table 4
Main and Integrative Effects of Niche Width, Market Position, and Over-
lap Density on the Disbanding/Exit Hazard of U.S. Automobile Manu-
facturers, 1885-1981·
Variable
Organizational size-based measures
Ln (Size)
u<7
u~7
Size S 50
u<7
u~7
Relative size (x 10-3)
Industry concentration (C4)
Evolutionary processes:
Scale competition x Size> 50
C4 x SIZe S 50
Technological niche width and position
Niche width (NW)
POSItIon:
Distance above market center (DAMC)
Distance below market center (DBMCl
Change in relative pOSItion
Evolutionary processes:
C4x NW
C4 x POSition: DAMC
C4 x POSition: DBMC
C4 x NW x Size $" 50
Overlap density
Nlche-overlap denSIty (NO)
Evolutionary processes:
C4 x NO
C4 x NO x Size S 50
Model 3
-0.11 1-4.031
-0.14 1-2.451
1.58 13191
1.03 11.741
-0.03 1-2.451
1.32 11.801
0.03 13.351
-1.15 1-1.891
-0.04 1-3.821
0.01 10.801
0.04 14.231
-0.001 1-0.271
0.05 14.591
-0.01 1-0.801
-0.04 1-3.751
-0.004 1-0.761
0.003 11.831
-0.004 1-2.031
0.004 lUll
Hypothesis
tested
H3
Hl
H2
H2
H4
H5
H6
Number of spells/events
Number of parameters
LR Test
8892/2051
37
48.6
Ivs. model 21
Log-likelihood -3644.7
.. T-statlstlcs are In parentheses; u denotes tenure In the Industry; model 3
Includes all cavanates from model 2
center, because the combined (main and integrativel effect is
still positive. But the difference in the effect when concentra-
tion is low and high is profound by any means, as figure 4
makes obvious.
The historical record also contains many examples consistent
with the findings on H1 and H2. For example, Wayne Works,
Inc., Martin Wasp Corp., Napoleon Motors Co., and many
other producers made successful inroads in the market in the
1920s as concentration neared its peak. Enthused by their
early success. these producers expanded their product lines
with new offerings that covered the market center. But these
moves brought them into direct competition with the estab-
lished and much larger industry leaders, and the subsequent
scale competition spelled doom for the upstarts.
Focusing on size differences among specialists, we conjec-
tured in H4 that as the market becomes concentrated and
the periphery expands, a narrow niche constitutes a disad-
vantage for small firms. This conjecture is supported by the
historical record. For example, a peripheral niche that
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Figure 3. Niche-width effect on the failure rate of U.S. auto manufacturers, 1885-1981.
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emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in the highly consolidated
U.S. auto industry developed around the revival of early
industry experiments with automobiles powered by an elec-
tric battery. Among the firms that entered this segment, the
longest surviving one was the Boulevard Motor Works, a firm
that" offered several different models, each ... [with] differ-
ent power depending on the number of electric motors
used" (Kowalke, 1997: 8241. The ironically dubbed "American
BMW" remained in existence for 16 years, far outlasting
other electric car producers. Another example, at the high
end of the specialized market periphery, comes from the
strategic position occupied by Shelby-Amer, Inc. This South-
ern California company produced a number of different
model sports cars with engine horse power ranging from 250
to 450 (i.e., it had a wide niche width). The success of the
company is well documented: it manufactured "one of the
best performing and best selling American specialty cars ever
produced" (Kowalke, 1997: 860). Despite these examples,
the empirical test of H4 is insufficient to reject the null
hypothesis: although, consistent with our expectation, the
effect of niche width interacted with industry concentration
and very small size is negative, it is not significant.
The effects for overlap density show that consolidation turns
the positive main effect around. As concentration rises, the
overall combined overlap density effect becomes negative,
not just the interaction effect. The estimated coefficients,
graphically presented in figure 5, support H5, namely, that
structured markets in which resources have been divided
promote mutual dependence and cooperation among incum-
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Figure 4. Effect of position (DBMe) on the failure rate of U.S. auto manufacturers, 1885-1981.
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bents. Nevertheless, to test the robustness of our findings
about overlap density and concentration, we experimented
with an alternative hypothesis: that the reversal of the over-
lap effect from positive to negative reflects the increasing
dimensionality of organizational niches and that industry con-
centration simply fits in as a proxy for this process. Separat-
ing the two processes (dimensionalization and cooperation) is
important because, while we fully concur that the two
processes unfold simultaneously, and this is part of our argu-
ment. we also think It unlikely that mutualism will occur
when the market is unsettled and resource competition is
intense. We tested for this alternative explanation by includ-
ing an additional Interaction of overlap density and industry
age. Although its effect was negative and significant. it did
not eliminate the significant negative effect of overlap densi-
ty and concentration. We conclude that our finding does sup-
port H5.
Finally, for H6, we reasoned that as the market concentrates,
the center will become consolidated and structured, while
resource-based competition will take place in the periphery.
So, for small specialists in quickly appreciating market niches
that invite the entry of competitors, overlap density would
signify a threat more than an opportunity for cooperation. As
anticipated, the three-way interaction between overlap densi-
ty, industry concentration, and very small size is positive, but
only marginally significant at the .10 level. We cannot conclu-
sively state that the effect of overlap density in concentrated
markets is different for very small producers than it is for all
other firms.
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Figure 5. Overlap~density effect on the failure rate of U.S. auto manufacturers. 188~1981.
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DISCUSSION
Many organizational analysts see the dominance of the
American automobile market by the Big Three as inevitable
given their technological, organizational, and political choices,
but an ecological perspective highlights the uncertain and
quasi-random nature of industrial evolution. This view accords
with that of industry historians such as Rae (1984: 641. who
observed about the 1920s, "When the boom period began,
Durant Motors, Studebaker, Hudson-Essex, Maxwell and
Willys-Overland could all conceivably have been competitors
of General Motors and Ford." To date, ecological research on
the automobile industry has focused on modeling basic evo-
lutionary processes involving organizational age, entry mode,
size, and density (e.g., Carroll and Hannan, 1995; Carroll et
aI., 1996; Kim, Dobrev, and Solari, 2001). One set of studies
demonstrated that organizational populations of automobile
producers undergo the expected density-dependent process-
es of legitimation and competition (Hannan and Carroll,
1992). These studies also showed that the geographic scale
of the legitimation process operates more broadly than com-
petition, transcending regional and national boundaries, while
competition tends to be more localized (Hannan et aI., 1995;
Bigelow et aI., 1997). Empirical research on national automo-
bile populations has also spawned a theory of population iner-
tia and a corresponding specification of the density model
that interacts the basIc processes with population age (Han-
nan, 1997).
In another set of studies, organizational size figures promi-
nently. Studying several national automobile populations,
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Hannan et al. (1998al showed that the effects of organiza-
tional size and mortality may emanate from both absolute
and relative firm size. Moreover, the effects of size on firm
mortality appear to be nonmonotonic and nonproportional
with respect to a firm's tenure in the industry, suggesting an
interaction between size (growth) and processes linked to
organizational aging, the so-called liabilities of newness, ado-
lescence, obsolescence, and senescence. The apparent com-
plexity of size effects presents a theoretical challenge. In
addressing the issue, Dobrev and Carroll (2000) used a model
of scale-based selection to explain mortality among automo-
bile producers The model assesses the competitive intensity
a firm confronts In the marketplace; It takes Into account the
firm's position In the size distribution and its distance relative
to competitors. Empirical estimates based on the model sug-
gest strongly that relative scale drives selection among large
automobile producers With positive feedback, a result consis-
tent with many other accounts.
A more recent set of studies has begun to investigate ques-
tions about automobile firms' product market positions and
the segmentation of producer populations. These efforts
were motivated in large part by the changing technology and
historically defined patterns of competitive segmentation that
have characterized the automobile industry (Womack, Jones,
and Roos, 1990). In the ecological perspective, motivation
also derives from an empirical finding in Hannan et al.'s
(1998al study of age and size that suggests the operation of
resource-partitioning (segmentation) processes in the Ameri-
can industry. The finding is that very small firms show
enhanced life chances at later ages, despite generally nega-
tive consequences of both small size and old age.
Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan's (2001) study directly examined
questions about positioning and segmentation of firms in the
European automobile industries, using conceptualizations of
the technological niche exactly like ours. In analyzing produc-
er mortality, Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan (2001) found that
broad niche width lowers rates of death but that niche over-
lap heightens the risk of mortality to an extent that more than
offsets the broad niche advantage. Their study also shows
that mortality chances rise when a producer firm substantially
changes ItS niche Width or its position.
Taken together, the findings from this stream of ecological
research demonstrate the operation of several different fun-
damental processes In populations of automobile producers.
But the question of integration remains: How well do the var-
ious theoretical fragments fit together? What type of integra-
tive theory is needed? At its most general level, our goal here
was to incorporate relevant theoretical ideas and models
from organizational ecology and to integrate them into a com-
prehensive evolutionary analysis of the U.S. automobile
industry. In doing so, we developed theory about how nlche-
based processes operate and change as the industry evolves
toward increasing concentration. This approach directs atten-
tion to the broader evolutionary environment without under-
mining recent advances in understanding competition and
crowding in the local environment.
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